Two forward observers and 5 other brokers who would supply security for them and who would clear and safe vehicles parked close by have been to take positions near the hay barn, which was situated on low floor a couple of quarter of a mile behind the Compound; 4 forward observers had been to set up within the undercover house. The hay barn crew was to arrive on the barn roughly two hours before the raid and transfer into place because the cattle trailers entered the grounds; the crew within the undercover house was to arrive the evening earlier than and set up surveillance the next morning. Figure 22: Side view of second cattle trailer. Figure 24: Photograph indicating planned deployment for SRTs. Figure 11: Main compound constructing (entrance facet). The Dallas SRT was to enter the front door and safe the second and third floors and the tower–areas believed to comprise the women and children’s bedrooms.
Cavanaugh, an SRT-skilled ASAC (Dallas) and Deputy Tactical Coordinator, could be stationed within the undercover home. McLennan County Deputy Sheriff Weyenberg knowledgeable Aguilera that daytime reconnaissance flights over the Compound had revealed men working in a development pit. In addition, the men routinely worked within the pit, which was at the far end of the Compound away from the arms room, starting at approximately 10:00 a.m. The farms had been usually situated far apart and their isolation deprived their residents of even these slight comforts and conveniences that city dwellers enjoyed. Block also recounted that Koresh had asked residents of the Compound how one can manufacture grenades and had mentioned activating a shipment of inert grenades he had received. According to block, Koresh usually saved the weapons subsequent to his room, which he decreed off limits to most Compound residents. Over the subsequent 10 days, Rodriguez visited the Compound several instances and sometimes engaged in prolonged conversations with Koresh. During the primary eight days, the brokers in the undercover home maintained surveillance of the Compound around the clock. The brokers within the undercover home communicated with the tactical planners primarily by providing surveillance logs, pictures, and videocassettes to a contact agent. Once they realized this, the planners asked Aguilera to discover a approach to lure Koresh away from the Compound instantly before the warrant was to be executed.
These interviews confirmed the dangers of a dynamic entry or a siege, especially if Koresh was in the Compound to offer leadership when a warrant was executed. Attorney Bill Johnston in Waco reviewed proof that had been developed by ATF and advised Special Agent Davy Aguilera that, though the investigation must be continued, there already was adequate evidence to meet the threshold of possible trigger for a search warrant. Directing Aguilera to focus his consideration on the possible trigger investigation, Sarabyn shortly assumed duty for tactical planning. From there, he could warn Chojnacki and Sarabyn if he or any of the opposite brokers witnessed any changes on the Compound. Aside from being informed to pay attention to the routines around the Compound and to gain entry to the inside if attainable, the brokers were not given a agency sense of what data the tactical planners were in search of, nor had been they kept abreast of the evolving tactical plan. To provide concealment from the Compound’s long-vary weapons–particularly its .50-caliber guns– in case agents had been compelled to retreat from the Compound on flat and open terrain, ATF requested smoke canisters from army sources shortly before the raid. During the subsequent two weeks, outlines of the ATF raid plan have been developed by Sarabyn and the SRT leaders who could be involved in the operation–Petrilli, Williams, Buford, and King.